The Virtue of Obscurity by Starger, Colin
Volume 59 
Issue 6 Tolle Lege Article 3 
9-1-2014 
The Virtue of Obscurity 
Colin Starger 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Family Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Colin Starger, The Virtue of Obscurity, 59 Vill. L. Rev. Tolle Lege 71 (2014). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol59/iss6/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW ONLINE: TOLLE LEGE CITE: 59 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 17 (2013) 
 
(17) 
THE VIRTUE OF OBSCURITY 
COLIN STARGER* 
N Something to (Lex Loci) Celebrationis?,1 Professor Meg Penrose 
echoes some recent criticism of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in United 
States v. Windsor.2  In particular, Professor Penrose highlights the view of those 
who “have been quick to criticize Justice Kennedy for his lack of clarity, if not 
fidelity, to constitutional review and applications of constitutional levels of 
scrutiny.”3  Though her article does not focus on “Justice Kennedy’s 
draftsmanship,”4 Professor Penrose nonetheless calls Kennedy’s review 
standard “difficult to discern” and bemoans the opinion’s constitutional 
ambiguity.5  Professor Penrose thus evidently shares the common frustration—
expressed by supporters and opponents of same-sex marriage alike—at what 
may be called Kennedy’s “doctrinal obscurity.” 
This frustration is understandable.  After all, Justice Kennedy plainly 
concludes that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) “violates 
basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal 
Government,” but he does not reach this conclusion via any traditional doctrinal 
test for substantive due process or equal protection.6  Thus, Kennedy does not 
ask whether DOMA burdens a right “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition,” nor does he identify sexual orientation as a suspect or semi-suspect 
classification, nor does he subject DOMA to explicit rational basis review.7  In 
short, Justice Scalia’s characterization of the majority’s analysis as “nonspecific 
hand-waving” seems on the money.8 
Yet this line of critique assumes that the Court should always aspire to 
specificity and clarity in its doctrinal analysis.  In this brief response, I seek to 
challenge that assumption and argue for the occasional virtue of doctrinal 
obscurity.  My argument here concerns situations like that presented by DOMA 
 
 *  Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law.  Thanks to Meg 
Penrose for inspiring this essay and inviting me to participate in the discussion.  Thanks too to 
the editors and staff at the Villanova Law Review for their great work and endless patience.  
Errors, quite naturally, are mine alone. 
1.  Meg Penrose, Something to (Lex Loci) Celebrationis?, 59 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE 
LEGE 1 (2013), available at http://lawweb2009.law.villanova.edu/lawreview/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/Penrose_FINAL.pdf. 
2.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
3.  Penrose, supra note 1, at 4.  In fact, as Professor Penrose notes, this criticism 
extends to Justice Kennedy’s other two significant gay rights decisions as well—Romer v. 
Evans and Lawrence v. Texas.  See id. at 3.  
4.  Id. at 4.  
5.  See id. at 2. 
6.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693; see also id. at 2693–96. 
7.  See id. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
720–21 (1997) (offering deeply-rooted-in-tradition test for substantive due process claims); 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (discussing “quasi-
suspect classification” equal protection analysis but rejecting its applicability to mental 
retardation). 
8.  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
I 
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where the Court confronts ugly social realities that have become codified in 
unpleasant laws or distasteful precedents.  Like speaking with a homophobic 
relative at a series of family dinners, these situations are inherently awkward 
and sometimes less-than-direct words are the best way to move the conversation 
in a productive direction.  Sometimes respect for etiquette counsels that the 
Court should dance around a little before declaring: “The Constitution does not 
allow this.”  In my view, Justice Kennedy’s obscurity in Windsor is justified by 
such doctrinal etiquette. 
To conduct this inquiry, I examine Justice Kennedy’s Windsor opinion 
from a different perspective.  Though obtuse in its relationship to traditional 
tests governing due process or equal protection, the opinion is hardly 
ungrounded in law or untethered to precedent.  Indeed, I agree with Professor 
Penrose’s assessment that “the better argument [is] that Windsor is the 
germinated outgrowth of the Court’s previous jurisprudence relating to gay 
rights.”9  In striking down a law undeniably hostile towards same-sex interests, 
the result in Windsor follows the big-picture pattern of Romer v. Evans10 and 
Lawrence v. Texas.11  As in Windsor, Justice Scalia energetically dissented in 
both Romer and Lawrence.  Analysis of the ongoing argument between 
Kennedy and Scalia in the two earlier cases provides the ultimate context for 
Kennedy’s polite recourse to doctrinal obscurity in Windsor. 
I. ROMER v. EVANS 
In Romer, the Court struck down Colorado’s Amendment 2.  Though the 
Amendment purported to only deny homosexuals “special rights,” the Court 
majority led by Kennedy found that the law actually imposed a special 
disability on LGBT persons, was “born of animosity towards [them],” and 
therefore violated equal protection.12  In dissent, Justice Scalia succinctly stated 
his grounds for disagreement: 
In holding that homosexuality cannot be singled out for disfavorable 
treatment, the Court contradicts a decision, unchallenged here, 
pronounced only 10 years ago, see Bowers v. Hardwick, . . . and 
places the prestige of this institution behind the proposition that 
opposition to homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious 
bias.13 
To many modern ears, especially those of younger readers, Scalia’s words 
might sound absurd or even hateful.  In this day and age, homophobia is in fact 
widely considered every bit as reprehensible as racism or religious intolerance.  
Yet in 1996, nearly two decades ago, a significant portion of the country felt 
 
9.  Penrose, supra note 1, at 1.   
10.  517 U.S. 620 (1996); see also id. at 635 (striking down Colorado’s Amendment 2 
on equal protection grounds). 
11.  539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also id. at 578–79 (striking down Texas law criminalizing 
same-sex intercourse). 
12.  See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631, 634–35. 
13.  Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S 186 (1986)). 
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just as Scalia did. 
Scalia’s reference to Bowers proves the point.  In 1996, it was still 
constitutional under Bowers to criminalize same-sex intercourse.  Laws across 
the country did just that.  So in his Romer dissent, Scalia bluntly reasoned that 
the discrimination against homosexuals authorized by Bowers a fortiori 
permitted the discrimination represented by Amendment 2.14  As a purely 
logical matter, this argument made sense.  Yet the logic depended on an ugly 
precedent that reflected an unpleasant reality about majority attitudes towards 
gays and lesbians.  In his dissent then, Scalia could effectively fashion himself 
as a defender of democracy and majority rule even as he peppered his opinion 
with sarcastic and paranoid references to “alternative life style[s]” and gay 
political influence.15 
This presented an awkward situation for Justice Kennedy and the Romer 
majority.  The Court had an arguably homophobic precedent on its own books 
that seemingly bolstered the constitutionality of the arguably homophobic 
Amendment 2.  Given that Bowers was only ten years old, frankly disavowing it 
because of its regressive attitudes risked embarrassing current and recent 
members of the Court, as well as harming the Court’s reputation.  And 
answering all of the questionable arguments and insinuations in Justice Scalia’s 
dissent would only give those unpleasant remarks credence. 
Luckily, Justice Kennedy found a polite way out of the bind.  The Romer 
majority could simply ignore Bowers because it was a substantive due process 
case—it had rejected the “claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to 
engage in acts of sodomy.”16  Romer could be decided on equal protection 
grounds.  In good conscience then, the Court could sidestep the whole Bowers 
mess as irrelevant.  Of course, this did not take care of the Bowers problem.  
(That would have to wait until Lawrence.)  Instead, Romer delicately moved the 
constitutional conversation in a helpful direction. 
Of course, deciding Romer on equal protection grounds did not solve all 
the Court’s doctrinal problems.  Traditional “tiers of scrutiny” jurisprudence 
bore little promise to strike down Amendment 2 because LGBT persons had 
never been recognized as a suspect class.  Given prevailing views and the 
absence of textual support, granting this recognition would have appeared 
heavy-handed, if not also anti-democratic.  Yet, once again, Justice Kennedy 
found a discrete way out.  First, he characterized Amendment 2 as sui generis 
and used this to justify his own novel decision: 
Amendment 2 confounds [the] normal process of judicial review.  It is 
at once too narrow and too broad.  It identifies persons by a single trait 
and then denies them protection across the board.  The resulting 
disqualification of a class of persons from the right to seek specific 
protection from the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence.17 
 
14.  See id. at 641 (quoting Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
15.  See id. at 645–46, 652–53. 
16.  See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190–91. 
17.  Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. 
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Second, Kennedy dug deep into the United States Reports and unearthed 
precedents that supported his approach to equal protection.18  Two of the 
precedents cited by Kennedy—Skinner v. Oklahoma19 and Department of 
Agriculture v. Moreno20—warrant closer attention because they represent 
earlier examples of virtuous doctrinal obscurity. 
A. Skinner v. Oklahoma 
Decided in 1942, Skinner involved a challenge to Oklahoma’s Habitual 
Criminal Sterilization Act (OHCSA).21  OHCSA provided for forced 
vasectomies for men (and salpingectomies for women) found to have 
committed three felonies involving moral turpitude.  However, the OHCSA 
excluded as qualifying crimes certain white-collar felonies including 
embezzlement and violation of the revenue laws.22  The OHCSA was thus an 
obvious piece of class legislation built upon a rather disgusting eugenics 
premise.23  The problem facing a Court inclined to strike the law down, 
however, was the existence of its own rather disgusting precedent seemingly 
authorizing the OHCSA—Buck v. Bell.24 
In 1927, none other than Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes penned the 
opinion for the Court upholding a forced sterilization performed upon Carrie 
Buck, an allegedly second-generation “feeble-minded white woman” residing in 
a state institution.25  The Commonwealth of Virginia sought to perform a 
salpingectomy before releasing her from the institution, and she challenged this 
action on due process and equal protection grounds.  In Buck v. Bell, Holmes 
infamously wrote: 
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate 
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society 
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.  
The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to 
cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. . . .  Three generations of imbeciles 
are enough.26 
Unlike his many other aphorisms, Holmes’s pithy words here have not 
aged well.  Yet in fairness, Holmes only reflected a then commonly-shared 
confidence in the morality and sensibility of eugenics. 
Returning to Skinner, the delicate nature of the doctrinal task then before 
 
18.  See id. at 634–35 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 
(1942) and Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)). 
19.  316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
20.  413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
21.  See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536. 
22.  See id. at 537. 
23.  The class-driven nature of the statute becomes even more apparent when 
considering that the petitioner in Skinner had “stealing chickens” as one of his qualifying 
felonies.  See id.   
24.  274 U.S. 200 (1927).  
25.  See id. at 205, 207 (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)).   
26.  Id. at 207. 
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the Court becomes apparent.  Striking down the Oklahoma law on conventional 
substantive due process grounds would require overruling a precedent penned 
by one of the Court’s most respected justices and revisiting his rather disturbing 
reasoning.  So instead, Justice Douglas turned to equal protection.  This was a 
surprising move at the time because, as Douglas recognized, “claim[s] that state 
legislation violate[] the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
[are] ‘the usual last resort of constitutional arguments.’”27  Such arguments 
almost invariably failed.28  Yet Douglas nonetheless concluded that the 
Oklahoma law violated equal protection because “[s]terilization of those who 
have thrice committed grand larceny with immunity for those who are 
embezzlers is a clear, pointed, unmistakable discrimination.”29 
To reach this result, Douglas introduced new doctrinal language that 
eventually became extremely influential.  After acknowledging the importance 
of deferring to the legislature, Douglas described marriage and procreation as 
“fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race” and warned that 
“evil or reckless hands” could use sterilization programs to “cause races or 
types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear.”30  
Douglas then wrote: 
We mention these matters not to reexamine the scope of the police 
power of the States.  We advert to them merely in emphasis of our 
view that strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a 
sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly or otherwise invidious 
discriminations are made against groups or types of individuals in 
violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws.31 
Critically, the italicized text represents the doctrinal origin of the modern 
strict scrutiny test.32  In other words, Douglas’s notion of strictly scrutinizing 
classifications that burden fundamental interests like marriage and procreation 
was untethered to precedent. 
Today we might praise Justice Douglas for his innovation, but at the time 
he could have been criticized for not utilizing traditional doctrinal tests.33  
Indeed, given that his “strict scrutiny” phrase would not have had nearly the 
 
27.  Skinner, 316 U.S. at 539 (quoting Buck, 274 U.S. at 208). 
28.  See id. at 540 (describing cases where equal protection arguments failed). 
29.  Id. at 541. 
30.  Id. 
31.  Id. (emphasis added). 
32.  After Skinner, individual members of the Court started to pick up on Skinner’s 
proposed “strict scrutiny” test in the sixties.  See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1967) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503 (1965) (White, J., 
concurring).  By the seventies, however, the doctrine had been adopted by the majority and 
developed into something resembling its current form.  See, e.g., San Antonio School District 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 nn.39–40 (1973). 
33.  This, of course, captures a problem inherent in any legal system rooted in stare 
decisis.  For further discussion, see Colin Starger, The Dialectic of Stare Decisis Doctrine, in 
PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 21–24 (Christopher J. Peters ed., forthcoming 
2014).  A draft of this chapter is available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2251556. 
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familiar ring that it does now, Douglas could have been fairly accused of being 
obscure.  This demonstrates a key characteristic of doctrinal obscurity—in a 
system where words live long past their authors, it is a relative concept.  What 
once sounds obscure may later become accepted common sense.  And, 
sometimes the initial impulse towards obscurity may be understood as a means 
of avoiding direct conflict with words that once rang true but now ring false or 
ugly. 
B. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno 
Now let us consider the other key cite made by Kennedy in Romer to 
justify his unusual brand of equal protection analysis—to Justice Brennan’s 
1973 majority opinion in Moreno.  In Romer, Kennedy cited Moreno for the 
proposition that equal protection prohibits laws that evince “a bare . . . desire to 
harm a politically unpopular group.”34  This notion that a law motivated by 
animus towards unpopular groups violates equal protection played a vital role in 
Kennedy’s Romer opinion.  Yet the concept’s doctrinal origins are again 
obscure. 
Moreno concerned the constitutionality of an amendment to the federal 
Food Stamp Act that denied food stamps to people in households composed of 
unrelated individuals.35  Justice Brennan noted that “traditional equal protection 
analysis” would only require that the legislative classification in the amendment 
be “rationally related to a legitimate government interest.”36  Brennan then 
pointed to the amendment’s legislative history, which revealed that the 
“amendment was intended to prevent so-called ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie 
communes’ from participating in the food stamp program.”37  (Here it is worth 
recalling that this amendment passed in 1971 when those freaked-out hippies 
really scared The Man).  For Brennan, this went beyond the pale.  He penned 
the line recalled above: “[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection 
of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare 
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a 
legitimate governmental interest.”38 
The result in Moreno was disputed.  Justice (not yet Chief) Rehnquist 
argued in dissent that the amendment could easily be sustained under traditional 
rational basis analysis with its generous deference to legislative 
classifications.39  As he very reasonably argued, the asserted congressional 
concern with the fraudulent use of food stamps was entirely rational, even if the 
Congress attacked the problem with “a rather blunt instrument.”40  Despite this 
 
34.  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).  As discussed below, Justice Kennedy cited Moreno for 
the exact same proposition in Windsor.  See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 
(2013) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534–35)). 
35.  See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529. 
36.  Id. at 533. 
37.  Id. at 534 (citing statement of Senator Holland). 
38.  Id. 
39.  See id. at 545–46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
40.  See id. 
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analysis, Rehnquist’s dissent does read persuasively today because it did not 
address at all Brennan’s now-famous and intuitively appealing argument that 
laws motivated by animus offend equal protection.  Perhaps Rehnquist ignored 
this argument because Brennan provided no doctrinal justification to back it up.  
Why contradict an argument based only on Brennan’s own say-so rather than 
precedent?  It must have seemed obscure. 
Yet Brennan’s approach has survived and even thrived.  Though it still 
does not fit neatly with traditional rational basis analysis,41 the idea that animus 
towards unpopular groups can violate equal protection is now firmly entrenched 
in the Court’s precedent.  Of course, Justice Kennedy’s invocation of Moreno in 
Romer very much helped the entrenchment process along.42  Perhaps 
Kennedy’s subsequent re-invocation of Moreno in Windsor marks 
entrenchment’s last step—making Moreno mainstream.  The point I wish to 
stress, however, is that Moreno, as well as Skinner, were doctrinally obscure at 
the time they were decided.  Yet this did not prevent the cases from helping to 
move the constitutional conversation in new—and, to my mind, positive—
directions. 
I similarly believe that Justice Kennedy’s obscurity in Romer also helpfully 
moved the Court’s gay rights jurisprudence.  To appreciate how, we must turn 
to the last pre-Windsor piece in the Court’s gay-rights puzzle—Lawrence v. 
Texas.43 
II. LAWRENCE v. TEXAS 
Decided in 2003, the Lawrence Court forthrightly overruled Bowers v. 
Hardwick and struck down a Texas law criminalizing same-sex intercourse on 
substantive due process grounds.44  While the bottom-line of Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion was crystal clear, the doctrinal path he followed to reach this 
result was less so. 
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, the Court did not strike down 
the Texas law via the well-known test from Washington v. Glucksberg45 that 
grants substantive due process protection only to fundamental rights “deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”46  Instead, Kennedy argued that 
“our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here,” and 
that the traditions “show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial 
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in 
 
41.  For an early critique suggesting that Moreno and its progeny be considered as 
employing a heightening form of scrutiny rather than rational basis, see City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 460, 478 n.4 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in 
judgment and dissenting in part). 
42.  City of Cleburne is the other major case that facilitated this entrenchment process.  
See id. at 446 (citing Moreno, 413 U.S. at 535). 
43.  539 U.S. 558 (2003).   
44.  See id. at 578–79. 
45.  521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
46.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 
721 (internal quotations omitted)). 
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matters pertaining to sex.”47  Though appealing, the idea that substantive due 
process gives special protection to private sexual choices was a new take on 
prior jurisprudence. 
To establish the existence of “emerging awareness” in the Court’s own 
doctrine, Kennedy relied on two principal cases—Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey48 and Romer v. Evans.49  Kennedy also argued that these same cases 
eroded the foundations of Bowers and authorized its overruling.50  Kennedy’s 
reference to Casey was fair enough.  Casey had reaffirmed a woman’s right to 
choose an abortion, and in so doing, suggested that due process liberty protected 
“intimate and personal choices” in matters of personal autonomy.51  On the 
other hand, Kennedy’s invocation of Romer showed a little cheek.  Kennedy 
argued that Romer challenged the central holding of Bowers because: 
[w]hen homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, 
that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual 
persons to discrimination both in the public and private spheres.52 
Here, Kennedy is being nothing if not obscure. 
As discussed above, Kennedy had steadfastly ignored Bowers in Romer.  
He had thus ignored Scalia’s logical argument that the constitutionality of 
criminalizing same-sex intercourse justified other less harsh discriminations 
against homosexuals.  Now in Lawrence, Kennedy deployed the precise inverse 
logical argument—reasoning that because Romer prohibited certain invidious 
discriminations against homosexuals, the even harsher discrimination of 
criminalizing homosexual conduct must also be unconstitutional.  This is quite a 
rhetorical sequence. 
Yet Kennedy’s discursive gymnastics have to be put in the context of 
Justice Scalia’s ongoing and unapologetic defense of the majority’s supposedly 
democratic prerogative to oppose gay rights and condemn LGBT people.  
During the course of his Lawrence dissent, Justice Scalia analogized same-sex 
intercourse to incest, prostitution, and bestiality.53  He chided the majority for 
signing on to “the so-called homosexual agenda . . . directed at eliminating the 
moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.”54  
This was illegitimate, per Scalia, because: 
[m]any Americans do not want persons who openly engage in 
 
47.  Id. at 571–72 (majority opinion). 
48.  505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573–75 (discussing Casey, 
505 U.S. at 851).  
49.  517 U.S. 620 (1996); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573–75 (discussing Romer, 
517 at 624, 634).  
50.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576. 
51.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
52.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. 
53.  See id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“State laws against bigamy, same-sex 
marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and 
obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral 
choices.”). 
54.  Id. at 602. 
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homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters for 
their children, as teachers in their children’s schools, or as boarders in 
their home.  They view this as protecting themselves and their families 
from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and destructive.55 
In the end, Scalia’s argument boiled down to the idea that the Court was 
acting in a fundamentally undemocratic manner—“imposing [its] views in 
absence of democratic majority will.”56 
In a literal sense, Scalia has a valid point.  The Lawrence Court did strike 
down democratic legislation and many Americans did embrace homophobic 
views in 2003 (as many, though no doubt less, do today).  Yet such logic would 
have upheld democratically enacted laws prohibiting inter-marriage at a time 
when many Americans embraced racist beliefs.  Of course, Scalia would likely 
reject the miscegenation analogy because prohibitions against race-based 
discriminations find textual support in the Constitution.  This is true so far as it 
goes, but ignores the fact that the relevant constitutional amendments became 
law after a bloody civil war rather than through truly democratic deliberation. 
Consider this: The democratic process cannot solve all constitutional 
problems.  Minority rights cannot be completely protected by relying on 
constitutional text and traditional doctrinal tests.  However true these 
observations may be, any Supreme Court justice would hesitate to enshrine such 
words in an opinion striking down democratic legislation.  Even though they 
essentially say nothing more than “our system is not perfect,” such words could 
be twisted to sound like a flat-out rejection of our entire system. 
So it makes sense that Justice Kennedy did not directly answer Justice 
Scalia’s argument in Lawrence regarding the majority views towards LGBT 
people.  It makes sense that he instead resorted to obscurity and abstraction, 
making assertions like “[the Court’s] obligation is to define the liberty of all, 
not to mandate our own moral code.”57  On this view, Justice Kennedy’s 
obscurity in Lawrence functioned as a polite response to Justice Scalia’s venom.  
It made clear that the Court was receptive to gay rights jurisprudence without 
needlessly insulting those who might be hostile to this undertaking.  Lawrence 
thus took a slow, albeit muddled, step towards civil equality for LGBT persons.  
And this was a good thing. 
III. CONCLUSION 
I have argued that the doctrinal obscurity inherent in the Court’s majority 
opinions from cases like Skinner, Moreno, Romer, and Lawrence has a certain 
virtue; and, Justice Kennedy’s Windsor opinion shares this virtue.  Part of the 
virtue I see in these earlier cases is that they helped facilitate positive changes in 
the law.  Admittedly, the notion that these particular cases represent positive 
developments stems from my own subjective moral judgment. 
 
55.  Id. 
56.  Id. at 603. 
57.  Id. at 571 (majority opinion) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
850 (1992)) (internal quotations omitted). 
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Yet I am comfortable in this judgment.  Not only do I reject eugenics and 
discrimination against unpopular groups like hippies, I also believe that 
Colorado’s Amendment 2 was a hateful piece of legislation.  I am therefore glad 
that Skinner and Moreno helped create the wiggle room in equal protection 
jurisprudence that permitted Justice Kennedy to compose a defensible 
justification for striking down the Colorado law in Romer.  Similarly, I regard 
the anti-sodomy law in Texas and DOMA as the product of outmoded—though, 
perhaps sincerely held—homophobic sentiment.  I therefore admire how Justice 
Kennedy cleverly built upon Romer in Lawrence and then upon both Romer and 
Lawrence in Windsor. 
At the same time, I recognize that my present moral judgment may not 
have aligned with the collective moral judgment of the majority of Americans at 
the time Skinner, Moreno, Romer, or Lawrence were decided.  I further 
recognize that the majority of Americans may not support the Court’s striking 
down of DOMA in Windsor.  In other words, I accept that all the cases I have 
called virtuous may have had an anti-democratic character.  But I do not believe 
this character marks the opinions as inherently anti-constitutional. 
Our Constitution seeks to strike a delicate balance between the rights of 
minorities against the will of the majority.  Similarly, the rule of law aims to 
promote stability through fidelity to the past while allowing change when 
innovation becomes necessary.  In a system such as this, tension abounds and 
contradictions are inevitable.  Constitutional moments will arise where one set 
of values must prevail—and a competing set must give way.  In such moments, 
it is not always the wisest course to frankly expose our system’s contradictions 
and risk undermining faith in a legal enterprise that fundamentally requires faith 
to function.  In such moments, obscurity can help reduce tensions and facilitate 
smoother transitions from the regrettable past to the promising future. 
In the end, I think the Court’s gay rights jurisprudence demonstrates this 
idea.  Americans’ attitudes about LGBT issues have come a long way since 
1986 and Bowers v. Hardwick.  The arc of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinions 
from Romer to Lawrence and now to Windsor seemed to keep the Court in the 
national conversation without needlessly stirring the pot.  Only time will tell 
how history will judge this trilogy of cases.  But I suspect that future 
generations will look back and find that, notwithstanding his obscurity, Justice 
Kennedy had the better of this long-running argument with Justice Scalia. 
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